Colonel Van Santvoord Merle-Smith

COLONEL VAN SANTVOORD MERLE SMITH
MILITARY ATTACHE, UNITED STATES MINISTRY
IN AUSTRALIA DURING WWII

Colonel Van Santvoord Merle-Smith was appointed Military Attache with the United States Ministry in Australia. Colonel Merle-Smith and his wife Kate and daughters Nancy aged 20 and Margaret aged 13 and son Fowler 15 arrived in Sydney from Long Island, New York on Tuesday 9 September 1941. An older son, Major Van Santvoord Merle- Smith Junior, who remained in the USA where he was a Lieutenant in the Field Artillery. They arrived in Melbourne on Monday 15 September 1941 where they made their home, where Nancy attended Melbourne University and Margaret and Fowler attended school.

In early November 1941, Captain Floyd Joaquin Pell, a West Pointer, Class of 1937, based in the Philippines was given the special assignment to co-ordinate the ferrying route for new B-17 Flying Fortresses across the Pacific to Clark Field in the Philippines. Pell travelled to Australia in early November 1941 where he co-ordinated his official mission with the US Military Attache, Colonel Van S. Merle-Smith in Canberra.

Colonel Van Santvoord Merle-Smith accompanied Major General Brereton from the Philippines to Australia before war broke out in the Pacific. At 1130 hours, on 19 November 1941, Air Commodore Francis William Fellowes Lukis (9), Air Officer Commanding Northern Area, invited Brigadier Francis "Frank" Roger North (QX50080), Officer Commanding 11th Infantry Brigade, Townsville, and Major General Lewis Hyde Brereton, Colonel Van Santvoord Merle-Smith, Colonel Eugene L. Eubank and Wing Commander William Henry "Bull" Garing to discuss proposals to establish an Air Depot in Townsville for the use of American aircraft.

At 0630 hours on 20 November 1941, Air Commodore Lukis accompanied Major General Brereton and his party southwards in a B-17 Flying Fortress for discussions with the Australian Air Board and General George H. Brett. Two hours after arriving in Melbourne on 20 November 1941, Brereton met with ACM Sir Charles Burnett, Chief of the Air Staff in Australia and explained the purpose of his visit to Australia. On the morning of 21 November 1941, Brereton and his party met at Victoria Barracks at St. Kilda, with representatives from the RAAF, members of the Defence Committee, and the General Staff. They had three full days of meetings, with Air Commodore Hewitt acting as Chairman of the meetings.

At about 5:00 p.m. on Thursday, 4 December 1941, Australian time (Wednesday, 3 December 1941, Washington D.C. time), Colonel Van S. Merle-Smith and Lieutenant Robert H. O'Dell, the Assistant Military Attache, were invited to a conference attended by Air Chief Marshal Charles Burnett, commander of the RAAF, and Commander G.B. Salm, the Dutch liaison officer from Batavia.

Air Chief Marshal Burnett advised Colonel Van S. Merle-Smith regarding information from Vice-Admiral Conrad Emil Lambert Helfrich, commander-in-chief of the Dutch Navy in the East Indies, that Japanese naval forces had crossed the line of 100 East and 10 North and was threatening Dutch and or American possessions. Commander Salm then informed that Dutch authorities in Batavia had ordered the execution of ABCD, and Rainbow 5 (A-2), the Dutch phase of the Rainbow 5 war plans. Commander Salm advised that the order to execute Rainbow 5 (A-2) was already in effect and that the Dutch were counting on assistance from the American Navy. Burnett closed the meeting so that he could attend an Australian War Council meeting that evening.

Merle-Smith returned to his office, and discussed the amazing information with Captain Charles A. Coursey, the American naval Attache in Melbourne. Coursey apparently declined to send any warning to naval authorities. If he had sent a warning to Admirals Hart, Kimmel or Stark it must have been suppressed and destroyed. Colonel Van S. Merle-Smith was determined to alert Generals Douglas MacArthur (Philippines) and Walter C. Short (Hawaii). He ordered his assistant O’Dell to code identical messages to MacArthur and Short. Burnett requested by telephone that evening that the messages be delayed until the forenoon of 5 December 1941, Australian time (4 December, Washington time.) The message was transmitted to MacArthur and Short at about11:00 a.m. on the morning of 5 December 1941, Australian time (4 December for Washington). Short was asked to forward the message on to Washington D.C. Merle-Smith’s message should have reached Manila and Fort Shafter on the early afternoon of 5 December (4 December, Washington time), and General Short in Hawaii should have forward the message to Washington before that evening.

Apparently the message was not decoded by Short’s staff at Fort Shafter, Oahu, possibly due to lack of trained personnel or availability of correct codes, but it was sent on to Washington D.C., where it was suppressed for two to three days. It may have reached the Army Signal Corps office in Washington D.C. on the night of 4 December 1941, Washington time, as it was sent from Melbourne to Hawaii at about 11:00 a.m. on 5 December 1941, Australian time, (4 December 1941, Washington time). However official Signal Corps records in Washington D.C., indicate that the Merle-Smith message was not received in Washington D.C. until 7:59 p.m. on 7 December 1941 well after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor.

Merle-Smith’s message was not sent back to General Short after it had been decoded and read by the Signal Corps in Washington D.C. If it had been sent back to General Short in Hawaii from Washington D.C., it could have perhaps led to a full alert in Hawaii on the early morning of the 5 December 1941, Washington time, possibly avoiding the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor.

Colonel Van Santvoord Merle-Smith played a pivotal role in the reception of the first American troops and supplies into south east Queensland, the erection of crated aircraft in south east Queensland and organising supplies for the besieged Americans behind enemy lines in the Philippines.

Under instructions from Washington D.C., Colonel Van S. Merle-Smith made arrangements for the reception of the Pensacola Convoy in Brisbane on 22 December 1941 and the subsequent unloading, and erection of crated aircraft at Archerfield and Amberley Airfields. Colonel Van S. Merle-Smith sent the following message to General Julian Barnes on the Pensacola Convoy on 21 December 1941, the day before the Convoy arrived in Brisbane:-

General Douglas MacArthur had sent coded messages requesting assistance from the United States Forces in Australia USFIA off the Pensacola Convoy which had only established itself a few hours earlier in Lennons Hotel. These messages had been received in the second floor communications centre in Lennons Hotel and had been decoded by 2nd Lt. Bobb Glenn and passed on to General Julian Barnes. Since no automatic encryption equipment existed, Colonel Van S. Merle-Smith and his assistant 1st Lt. J. Odell, had travelled to Brisbane with the double transposition cipher codes. The codes were handled by Lieutenant Mark Muller, who encoded Barnes's replies to MacArthur as he dictated them. The encoded messages were then taken to the signal office of the RAAF for dispatch to the Philippines via Washington D.C. It was a roundabout way of doing things, but it was the best they could manage on Day 1 of the Australian operation.

Colonel Merle-Smith had an encounter with the controversial character L. Ron Hubbard who was based in Australia in the first few months of 1942. Apparently Hubbard had made some insinuations about Sir Thomas Gordon's loyalty to the Allied cause. Sir Thomas Gordon was a senior British official in charge of wartime shipping in Australia. Hubbard was ordered to remain in Melbourne overnight and make himself available the following day for an interview with Commander Causey and Colonel Van Santvoord Merle-Smith.

Colonel Van S. Merle-Smith was instrumental in the planning for the evacuation of General Douglas MacArthur from the Philippines to Melbourne in March 1942. Merle-Smith was subsequently absorbed into the G-2 Section of GHQ, SWPA reporting to Brigadier General C.A. Willoughby. Lieutenant Colonel Karl Ferguson Baldwin took over as the Military Attache in Australia and Merle-Smith offside O'Dell was sent to New Zealand. Merle-Smith had a close relationship with Commander Rupert Long, the Royal Australian Navy head of naval intelligence.

In June 1942, Colonel Van S. Merle-Smith summoned Lt. Col. Allison Ind to a meeting. Merle-Smith spoke of the need to draw up an official document to activate and operate what they agreed should be called the "Allied Intelligence Bureau AIB. The Controller of the AIB would be the current Director of Military Intelligence for the Australian Army, Colonel C.G. Roberts. Allison Ind was to be the Deputy Controller and Finance Officer. They initially operated from the 5th floor of 121 Collins Street, Melbourne. They later operated from the 4th Floor of Heindorff House at 171 Queen Street Brisbane after GHQ moved to Brisbane in July 1942. Merle-Smith met with Ind and Roberts through the rest of June 1942 to formulate the directive establishing AIB. This directive was published in orders dated 6 July 1942.

The December 1942 edition of the Brisbane Military Telephone Directory shows Col. V.S. Merle-Smith in the G-2 Section of GHQ SWPA in Room 802 in the AMP building. This was the floor where General Douglas MacArthur had his office. Merle-Smith reported to Brigadier General C.A. Willoughby at that time. Colonel Merle-Smith's quarters at that time was in Room 5 on the third Floor of Lennons Hotel.

In 1942 when escapees from the Philippines were beginning to reach Australia, Colonel Merle-Smith, had the foresight to arrange for thorough interrogations and interviews of all repatriates. He developed a Philippine Sub-Section, as a miniature G-2 concerned solely with Philippine intelligence, in contrast with the broad general interest and activities of its parent organisation.

General Douglas MacArthur's office diary shows that Merle Smith had the following meetings with General MacArthur:-

Colonel Van Santvoord Merle-Smith was awarded the DSM "for exceptionally meritorious services in supplying from Australia Americans besieged during the Philippines Campaign."

In 1943, the over worked Colonel Van Santvoord Merle-Smith had been told to rest and while reluctantly complying, he suffered a heart seizure. He was flown back to the USA where he died in New York in early November 1943. One source states that he had a nervous breakdown.

After WWII, the United States Senate Pearl Harbor investigation wanted to know if the message sent by Col Van S. Merle-Smith on 4 December 1941 had not been delayed, would it have helped to forewarn Americans of the impending Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor.

Colonel Rufus Bratton, Chief of the US Army’s Far Eastern Military Intelligence Section claimed at the investigation that the Australian Government held up for 17 hours a message by Col. Van S. Merle-Smith, which warned that the Dutch Government had put its war plans into operation because of Japanese Naval movements. He stated that the message was finally delivered 12 hours after the Japanese began their attack on Pearl Harbor.

Col Bratton confirmed a suggestion from Senator Ferguson, that the message had been delayed until a Cabinet meeting could be held.

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