INTER-ALLIED SERVICES DEPARTMENT (ISD)
SECTION "A" OF ALLIED INTELLIGENCE BUREAU
SPECIAL OPERATIONS AUSTRALIA (SOA)
OPERATED UNDER THE COVER NAME OF
SERVICES RECONNAISSANCE DEPARTMENT (SRD)

 

In March 1942, Prime Minister John Curtin approved the establishment of an offshoot of the British Special Operation Executive (SOE) in Australia. This idea had been proposed by General Blamey.

One of these SOE British Officers was Major Grey Egerton Mott who arrived in Australia from Java on 17 March 1942 after it was taken over by the Japanese. Major Mott had been Head of British SOE in Java. Since he was a member of the Civil Component of SOE Far Eastern Mission he was retained in Australia and as he was senior to Trappes-Lomax he became the principal advisor to the Director of Military Operations DMO, Colonel Hopkins, on Special Operations matters.

Mott and Trappes-Lomax were give a small office in Victoria Barracks in Melbourne and worked directly with DMO and were in close contact with Commander Long, the Director of Naval Intelligence. Commander Long and Major Mott worked together to endeavour to set up a Special Operations organisation under civil cover with the backing of the Prime Minister.

On 27 March 1942, Major Mott flew to Canberra with Sir Owen Dixon, Pay Commander J. C. R. Proud, RANVR, a propaganda specialist, and Mr. Lovink, a Dutch Secret Service expert. As no one had been briefed for the discussions, and as no one knew exactly why Mott went to Canberra, the meeting proved rather abortive. Subversive activities were discussed in a general matter at the meeting, and the facts disclosed had some bearing on the future establishment of Special Operations in Australia.

It was pointed out at the meeting that SOE functioned under the control of the War Cabinet through the Ministry of Economic Warfare but in close liaison with the Admiralty, the War Office and the Air Ministry. In theatres of war, the British SOE operated under the direct control of the C-in-C. It was recommended that if a Special Operations was set up in Australia it should function directly under the C-in-C, maintaining very close liaison with all the Services.

In the meantime, the DMO asked for a memorandum on Special Operations possibilities based on Australia to be submitted to the CGS for consideration by War Cabinet. Major Mott did not have any direct contact with the CGS, or Lieutenant General Sturdee until the middle of April 1942.

On 7 April 1942, Major Mott conferred with Generals Blamey and Sturdee. General Blamey was in favour of the immediate formation of a Special Operations organisation under the operation control of the C-in-C.

Major Mott prepared an outline of the proposal and a preliminary budget of £100,000 for the first 12 months which was submitted to General Blamey, who after conferring with the Prime Minister, submitted it to the new Supreme Commander, Southwest Pacific Area, General Douglas MacArthur.

General Douglas MacArthur approved the proposal on 17 April 1942. General Blamey instructed Major Mott to set up the Headquarters for the new organisation immediately and to act on behalf of the General Staff in contacting the Dutch authorities. Mott was promoted to Lieutenant Colonel and he understood that the C-in-C would eventually appoint a senior Staff Officer to control the organisation. General MacArthur had not issued a general directive and no arrangements had been made to provide the necessary funds.

On 26 April 1942, General Blamey advised the War Office that General MacArthur had agreed to:-

Authority was given to Mott:-

On 17 May 1942, two months after arriving in Australia, Lt. Col. G. E. Mott established the Inter-Allied Services Department (ISD) in its new headquarters in "Airlie", located at 260 Domain Road on the corner of Punt Road in Melbourne.

Up till then Mott and Trappes-Lomax had continued to work together in the same small room in Victoria Barracks. By then no funds had still been provided to Mott, however London allowed Mott to use the Special Operations funds that he had brought back from Java. He was able to use this to buy office furniture, pay salaries and out-of-pocket expenses.

At the end of May 1942, it was finally agreed that each of the three participating Governments should subscribe £15,000 each as an initial payment for the first six months' operation of ISD.

The staff at ISD at "Airlie" initially comprised:-

Lieutenant Colonel Egerton Mott, Director
Major A.E.B. Trappes-Lomax, Training and Stores
Lieutenant Commander J.J. Quere, NEI Section
Captain J. Jansen, NEI Section (Wireless Telegraphy and Communications NEI)
Major Stanley Sibb Caporn (VX43369), Administration and Personnel
Captain John Keith McCarthy (NGX258) , New Guinea and Islands Sections
Captain Jack Lester Chipper (VX80604), New Guinea and Islands Sections
3 Secretaries (does anyone know their names?)

Before the end of May 1942, ISD Headquarters Staff had been extended to include:-

Major Allan Richard Harvey (VX108401), Stores and Equipment
Lieutenant L.G. McGowan, RNVR, Finance Director
Lieutenant Henry William Traynor, RANVR, Intelligence Section
Major Arthur Gordon Oldham (350248), Deputy Director
Major Morris Samuel Israel (VX108402), Communications Officer
Mr. H.B. Manderson, Timor Section

A number of operatives were selected and sent to the Training School at Forster, where by arrangement with the Director of Military Training DMT, ISD had its own section.

ISD was staffed with saboteurs, commandos and spies whose job it was to:-

- harass enemy lines of communications

- attack enemy shipping and small craft in harbours and rivers

- organise resistance by local inhabitants

- establish secret communications

- disseminate propaganda against the Japanese and Germans

- direct sabotage, subversion and fifth-column activity

Some SOE British Officers who had escaped to Australia from Singapore, formed the nucleus of ISD at its headquarters in Melbourne.

In early June 1942 ISD communications within Australia were established as follows:-

The arrangement with DMT for the use of the Guerilla Warfare School at Foster was not satisfactory for several reasons:-

It was decided to establish a separate school at Cairns in north Queensland under the cover name of Z Experimental Station ZES with General Blamey's consent. This location was ideal for sea and land training but security became difficult with the large number of troops pouring into the Cairns area.

A small ship base and training camp, going by the code name of Lugger Maintenance Section, was established near Darwin to support operations into Timor and NEI. Overall Special Operations had been carried out in Timor, New Guinea, NEI and the Aroe Islands.

On instructions from General Blamey, the Master-General of the Ordnance had furnished Z Special Unit with an unlimited authority to draw from Ordnance, and this was extended to cover the camp at Cairns. Similar arrangements were made with the AASC, allowing ISD to draw rations, petrol and supplies. Other supplies were obtained from US sources. Special items such as trade goods were acquired by local purchases and all Special Operations stores were obtained from London.

Most ISD personnel were being recruited from the three Australian Services but mainly from the AMF. The question of posting military personnel and arranging military cover for civilians was at first a major problem. This was overcome by the creation by the CGS in June 1942 of a special unit, known as "Z Special Unit" which was duly added to the Order of Battle. "Z Special Unit" had no War Establishment and no war equipment table. It had 'carte blanche' authority to draw for Ordnance, and as it was controlled, run and paid by ISD, it held a unique position in the Australian Army. Its formation increased security, and was of great assistance in stabilising ISD's stores arrangements with the maximum of security.

In early September 1942, it was decided that although the functions of ISD parties in New Guinea and Papua had come primarily into the sphere of the Combined Field Intelligence Section, the parties would remain under the control of ISD.

ISD was to be responsible for stores, equipment and training of all Sections. A proportion of Headquarters expenses and expenses in connection with stores and training were debited to the Combined Field Intelligence Section.

The Americans were not keen on the existence of an intelligence unit in their theatre of war that had been set up by the British. They also had similar problems with some independent Dutch Intelligence units. In an endeavour to bring these "foreign" units into line, the Americans established the Allied Intelligence Bureau (AIB) on 6 July 1942 and ISD became Section "A" of AIB. An American Officer, Lt. Col. Allison W. Ind, was appointed as the Finance Officer in AIB. This was apparently a strategy to starve the British and Dutch Intelligence units of funds to stifle their "errant ways".

At this time difficulties began to arise with GHQ, SWPA. Brigadier General C. A. Willoughby, Colonel Merle-Smith and AIB apparently understood the directive in a different sense to Lt Col Mott. They believed that ISD was to be used mainly for Military Intelligence, and it seemed that proper Special Operations activities were neither understood nor desired.

ISD had guaranteed funds of £45,000 for Special Operations purposes by AIB wanted access to these funds for Intelligence purposes.

ISD was producing its own W/T equipment and had facilities for training and equipping personnel, and a number of parties in the field in New Guinea. Whereas Section C, Field Intelligence, had no funds, stores or facilities. It had no NEI Section or personnel, but Lt. Cmdr. J. J. Quere, head of ISD's NEI Section was engaged on this work, which led to some friction with GHQ regarding the status of parties going into the NEI. Were they Section A or Section C personnel? Was their role Special Operations or Field Intelligence?

Late in September 1942, Lt Col Mott wrote to Colonel Roberts, stating that in his opinion the whole trouble was that GHQ, SWPA tended to look on ISD as a subsidiary Intelligence Organisation. He stated that GHQ apparently wanted to turn the existing Special Operations into watertight compartments of intelligence and operations which was not possible. The only way out of the impasse, assuming that GHQ did not agree with this point of view, was for ISD to come under General Chamberlain in charge of Operations.

In the middle of November 1942, Lt Col Mott, Col Roberts and Col Merle-Smith met to discuss the difficulties but no decision was made. GHQ was not satisfied with the working of ISD and concerned at the friction between ISD and AIB. Col Roberts suggested that SOE (UK) be asked to recall Col Mott, that Major Oldham become the Director of ISD, and that SOE (UK) send out an adviser not above the rank of Major.

There were five main difficulties surround the operations of ISD:-

1. After the transfer of ISD to AIB there was misunderstanding concerning the status and duties of ISD. Lt Col Mott believed that the original arrangements approved by MacArthur back in April 1942 still held good.

2. A change in the role of the New Guinea parties for Special Operations to Field Intelligence and the inevitable merging of these with the Military Intelligence network had caused confusion and loss of security. It was decided to transfer these parties to Section C in AIB.

3. The fact that Lt Cmdr Quere was running both ISD and Field Intelligence parties in the NEI was considered most unsatisfactory, as the Field Intelligence operatives would work in with the normal intelligence network, thus compromising ISD. This it became essential that a separate director for Field Intelligence should be appointed.

4. There was a misunderstanding regarding non-operational parties planned for initial reconnaissance as a preliminary to later Special Operations. There was a tendency to treat these parties as purely Field Intelligence parties. Nevertheless the type of intelligence required by ISD differed in many respects from the intelligence that was required for normal operations.

5. Complications also arose with the division of the estimated expenditure between Section A (ISD) and Section C (Field Intelligence).

The NEI Section was an integral part of ISD and provision had been made in the ISD budget for its financial requirements. It had no financial system of its own, and all its funds came directly under the control of ISD.

Merle-Smith stated that ISD and NEI Intelligence would share equally in the total budget for ISD. He stated also that the AIB directive of 6 July 1942, and the negotiations between the various governments concerned superseded the appropriations previously considered for ISD prior to its transfer to GHQ. He went on to say "Your apparent assumption that such tentative appropriation was of a contractual nature which could not be changed without your personal consent is untenable." He also stated that the whole matter of the future status of ISD and Mott's connection with it was under review by GHQ. Mott, he intimated, would be advised of the decision. Mott duly advised General Blamey of this communication.

Mott's position as Director of ISD and Adviser to AIB on Special Operations had by then become impossible. In February 1943, Mott was relieved, ISD was liquidated and Mott left Australia for London. This left the future of Special Operations in Australia very unclear.

When Lt Col Mott was relieved of his post, Dutch Admiral Coster informed GHQ that the NEI authorities had been entirely satisfied with ISD as originally constituted. Lt Col Chapman-Walker who had come to Australia to advise on Special Operations, entered into negotiations to try to preserve Special Operations in Australia. He was able to establish a new organisation with the secret name of Special Operations Australia SOA which reported to the C-in-C Allied Land Forces.

Special Operations Australia SOA was established for the dual purpose of:-

General Blamey arranged with SOE (UK) that Lt Col Chapman Walker would remain in Australia and become the Commanding Officer of SOA.

 

Still being updated

 

Special Operations Australia was the "dirty tricks" department of the Allied Intelligence Bureau (AIB).  

In March 1943, relationships with AIB were so bad that SOA was restructured. The British Commanding Officer of ISD was replaced by AIB with another SOE officer from London and the group became known as Services Reconnaissance Department (SRD). Lt. Col. P.J .F. Chapman-Walker was appointed Director of SRD and given the temporary rank of Colonel. He had his offices at 39 Ackland Street, South Yarra.

In December 2002, the one surviving member of the SRD Directorate was Sir John Holland, who post WWII formed John Holland Constructions.

A Naval Intelligence Officer acted as Liaison Officer between SRD and the Director of Naval Intelligence, and certain other Naval personnel were included in the organisation as operatives.

 

SRD PROVISIONAL WAR COMPLEMENT

1    Commander
1    Lieutenant Commander
2    Lieutenant Commanders or Lieutenants
45  Lieutenants or Sub. Lieutenants
1    Chief Petty Officer
2    Chief Petty Officers or Petty Officers
26  Petty Officers (Mostly N.A.P. Mates)
19  Leading Seamen
84  Able Seamen or Ordinary Seamen
4    Telegraphists
37  Motor Mechanics (Include 2 Senior M.M.'s)
2    Leading Stokers
26  Stokers
2    Shipwrights
1    Leading Writer
2    Cook (s)

255  Total

 

MELBOURNE HEADQUARTERS

1    Commander        Department of the Navy
1    Lieutenant or Sub. Lieutenant    Assistant Staff Officer
1    Lieutenant or Sub' Lieutenant    N.I.O.
1    Leading Writer

4  Total

 

S.R.D. CAMP AT FRASER COMMANDO SCHOOL

1    Lieutenant or Sub. Lieutenant
1    Chief Petty Officer
1    Shipwright

3   Total

 

NAVAL OFFICER-IN-CHARGE, HORNBILL

1    Lieutenant

 

FREMANTLE BASE

1    Lieutenant Commander
1    Shipwright
1    Motor Mechanic
1    Leading Seaman

4  Total

 

DARWIN BASE

1    Lieutenant

 

The Naval Section of SRD was established in January 1944. Initially, the Naval Section had only two vessels:-

Krait - 70 foot, 68 gross tons Japanese fishing vessel originally called Kofuku Maru.

Alatna - 62 foot Australian Army launch used as a tender

 

SOA Operations

Timor - Lesser Sundas - Java

Mackerel
Tiger I
Tiger II
Tiger III
Tiger IV
Tiger V
Tiger VI
Lion
Flounder
Ambon -23 A2
210 Avoe Is (Walnut)
Walnut 1
Walnut 2
Walnut 3
Lizard I
Lizard II
Lizard III
Portolizard
Lagarto
Cobra
Adder
Mugger
Hornet
Bat
Apache
Wasp
Gnat
Flea
Louse
Sounder
Sunfish
Sunable
Sunbaker
Suncharlie
Starling - Sundog
Sundog Raid
Blackfish
Blackbird
Sunlag
Lagartout
Brim
Pigeon
Suncob
Cobrexit
Salmon
Carp
Cod
Starfish
Binatang
Anchovy
Groper
Demo

 

New Guinea

Cockroach
Beetle
Ladybird
Spider
Wasp
Tick
Bug
Locust
Whiting (21A-Hollandia)
Scorpion
Mosstroops
Menzies
Perch
Reaper
Silver (Oak)
Gold (Oregon)
Copper (Ash)
Vokeo
Crayfish
Falcon
Phoenix I
Phoenix II
Roc
Dodo
Moa
Lennons
Socrates
Flathead
 

Borneo

Python - Phase II
Python - Phase II
Agas I
Agas II
Agas III
Agas IV
Agas V
Semut I
Semut II
Semut III
Semut IV
Squirrel
Stallion - Phase I
Stallion - Phase II
Stallion - Phase III
Stallion - Phase IV
Stallion Phase V (Gelding)
Stallion - Phase VI (Mare)
Stallion - Phase VII
Stallion - Phase VII (Filly, Colt & Foal)
Platypus I (Robin)
Platypus II
Platypus III
Platypus IV
Platypus V
Platypus VI
Platypus VII
Platypus VIII
Platypus IX
Platypus X
Platyous XI
Platypus XII
Toad
Vulture

 

Celebes and Moluccas

Giraffe I
Giraffe II
Giraffe III
Crane I
Crane II
Shrill
Magpie I
Magpie II
Magpie III
Raven
Garfish
Opossum
Swallow
Swift
Finch I
Finch II
Finch III
Finch IV

 

China Sea and Malaya

Jaywick
Rimau
Politician - Optician
Gunard
Crocodile
Carpenter I
Carpenter II
Carpenter III
Carpenter IV
Period
Oblivion

NOTE:- Richard J. Aldrich in his book titled "Britain's Secret Intelligence Service in Asia during the Second World War" on page 192 states "Similarly SOE went by the local name of 'Force 136' in this part of the world, while the MI9 escape organisation chose the name 'E Group'". A search of the NAA files show a number of digitised files when you search for "Force 136". A close look at one of the files on page 17 shows that Force 136 Headquarters was at Kandy (Ceylon) on 18 July 1945 and discusses stores drops to parties in Malaya. So it would appear that SOE (the Brits) operating under the cover name Force 136 were co-operating with SOA (the Aussies). Another one of the Force 136 files has a number of photos including one of the men training at Fraser Island.

 

REFERENCE BOOKS

"Silent Feet - The History of "Z" Special Operations 1942 - 1945"
by G.B. Courtney, MBE, MC

"The Story of the Krait - Tigers & Snakes"

"Britain's Secret Intelligence Service in Asia during the Second World War"
by Richard J. Aldrich

"Special Operations Australia being the History of Inter-Allied Services Department and Services Reconnaissance Department", NAA file

 

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I'd like to thank Graham McKenzie-Smith for his assistance with this web page.

 

Can anyone help me with more information?

 

"Australia @ War" WWII Research Products

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©  Peter Dunn 2015

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This page first produced 7 August 2001

This page last updated 23 January 2022