LT. COL. BENJAMIN BUTLER CAIN
ASSISTANT DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE
ALLIED AIR FORCE
IN AUSTRALIA DURING WWII

Benjamin Cain told the December 1946 class at the Air War College in Maxwell AFB that he had been an "information soldier in the hunt for Pancho Villa" on the US-Mexican border in 1916. He considered himself a failure as he never got to interview a live Mexican.

Early in WWII in Europe, he was in combat intelligence with the British RAF. He was described as a no-nonsense leader who believed that intelligence had not changed since Moses sent spies into Canaan. Since the US was not in the war at that stage, his role in Britain was as an observer.

Major Benjamin Butler Cain arrived in Australia in March 1942 having "26 years of experience". He arrived 5 months before General George C. Kenney. Lieutenant Colonel Benjamin Cain was initially the Assistant Director of Intelligence in the Allied Air Force (see organisation structure below) in Brisbane. When General George C. Kenney arrived in September 1942, Cain also took on the additional duty of A-2, Fifth Air Force.

The December 1942 edition of the GHQ SWPA Telephone Directory shows shows entries for Lieutenant Colonel Ben Cain as follows: -.

Headquarters - Fifth Air Force and Air Service Command
    Office of the Chief of Staff
        A-2 (Intelligence Allied Air Forces)
            Lt. Col. B. B. Cain
            Room 413
            Telephone No. AMP 117

Allied Air Force
    Directorate of Intelligence
        Lt. Col. B. B. Cain
        Room 413
        Telephone No. AMP 117

The October 1943 edition of the GHQ SWPA Telephone Directory shows entries for Lieutenant Colonel Ben Cain as follows:-

Headquarters Fifth Air Force
    A-2 Section
        Lt. Col. Cain, B. B.
        Room 413
       Telephone No. AMP 117

Allied Air Force
    Directorate of Intelligence
        Assistant Director
        Lt. Col. B. B. Cain
        Room 413
        Telephone No. AMP 117

The May 1944 edition of the GHQ SWPA Telephone Directory shows entries for Lieutenant Colonel Ben Cain as follows:-

Headquarters Fifth Air Force
    A-2 Section
        A-2
        Lt. Col. Cain, B. B.
        Room 413
        Telephone No. AMP 117

Allied Air Force
    Directorate of Intelligence
        Assistant Director
        Lt. Col. B. B. Cain
        Room 413
        Telephone No. AMP 117

Lieutenant Colonel Ben Cain does not appear in the February 1945 edition of the GHQ SWPA Telephone Directory.

Brisbane produced "minimal original analytical products", largely because Air Commodore Joseph Hewitt and Cain were building the Directorate of Intelligence from the ground up. Cain told the December 1946 class that they were using maps from oil companies such as Shell, and National Geographic.

Lt. Col. Cain always maintained that the Army shared all intelligence with the US Navy, but the Navy didn't return the favour.

Initially Air Force intelligence was almost entirely from the Coast Watchers. ULTRA went only to General Kenney, who would give directions to Lt. Gen. Ennis C. Whitehead and General Kenneth Walker based on it, to minimise the chance of a leak. Cain was looking more at strategic intelligence, leaving tactical to those in Port Moresby. He says the use of reconnaissance flights to areas known from ULTRA intelligence as a cover so the Japanese would not realise the code was broken was a Kenney innovation, that became standard practice.

The War Room on the 4th floor of the AMP building, General MacArthur's GHQ SWPA, was operated by the A-2 Intelligence Section. The room contained a realistic map representation of the combat zone occupying an area about 30 x 30 feet. On one side a gallery accommodated spectators, and on the opposite side there was a platform and several sliding display boards, which area was utilised by the officers presenting the situation. Models of soldiers, airplanes, and ships were placed and moved about the floor while the presentation was in progress. Auxiliary maps and chart were placed on the sliding boards for display as needed during the talk. Most days at 1000 hours a briefing was given to sum up the events of the past 24 hours. Important events were presented immediately to Kenney or Cain at any time of day or night.

Cain's deputy at the Advanced Headquarters, Col. Harry F. Cunningham, told Whitehead after the war that he had had little respect for Cain. He thought he was "more suited for public relations than for intelligence." General George C. Kenney was frustrated by Cain's lack of imagination, but Cain was determined to build reliable information, not make fantastical leaps.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I'd like to thank Karen Nunan for her assistance with this web page.

Can anyone help me with more information?

"Australia @ War" WWII Research Products

This page first produced 7 January 2020

This page last updated 15 January 2020